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Abstract
The accumulated criminal records shows that serious and minor crimes differ in many
measures and are related in a complex way. While some of those who have committed minor
crime spontaneously evolve into serious criminals, the transition from minor crime to major
crime involves many social factors and have not been fully understood yet. In this work, we
present a mathematical model to describe how minor criminals turns in to major criminals
inside and outside of prisons. The model is design to implement two social effects which
respectively have been conceptualized in popular terms “broken windows effect” and “prison
as a crime school.” Analysis of the system shows how the crime-related parameters such as
the arrest rate, the period of imprisonment and the in-prison contact rate affect the criminal
distribution at equilibrium. Without proper control of contact between prisoners, the longer
imprisonment rather increases occurrence of serious crimes in society. An optimal allocation of
the police resources to suppress crimes is also discussed.
1 Introduction
Understanding what factors cause a high crime rate is essential to developing effective measures to
prevent crime in a community. The accumulated criminal records [8, 15] shows that serious and
minor crimes differ in many measures such as occurrence rate, arrest rate and rehabilitation rate.
There is also difference between control activity of the police devoted to serious crimes and that
devoted to minor crimes [2].
In recent years, there have been substantial progresses in developing mathematical tools to
investigate criminal activity. Mathematical models based on the reaction-diffusion equations have
been proposed [30, 28, 27] to study dynamics of localized patterns of criminal activity, especially
focusing on the re-victimisation phenomena and the hot-spot formation. Some other models have
adapted their basis from population biology, such as infectious disease models [4, 22, 18] and
predator-prey models [34, 6, 20]. A similar approach was used for modeling organized crimes
[7, 32], where gang membership is treated as an infection that multiplies through peer contagion.
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In this study, we present a mathematical model to describe how minor criminals turns in to
major criminals. While some of those who have committed minor crime spontaneously evolve
into serious criminals [21], the transition from minor crime to major crime involves many social
factors and have not been fully understood yet. Besides the basic progressive nature of crime, we
are interested in finding extra factors that accelerate the transition from minor crimes to major
crimes. This paper focuses on criminal transitions occurring inside and outside of prison, which
respectively have been conceptualized in popular terms “broken windows effect” and “prison as
a crime school”: the broken windows theory states that accumulation of low level offenses in a
community, if not adequately controlled, acts as a social pressure that leads to more serious crimes
[36, 12, 5]. On the contrary, in prisons, staying with many criminal peers in a limited facility makes
minor criminals frequently contact with hard-core and skilled criminals and possibly deepens their
illegal involvement [11, 9, 13]. The peer-effect on crime recidivism is strongly supported by recent
empirical research in many countries [1, 10, 24].
We are especially interested in the influence of over-crowded prison facilities on criminal transi-
tion. A mathematical model reflecting the effect of incarceration on recidivism has been proposed
in [18]. However, to the authors’ knowledge, the in-prison dynamics between minor and major crim-
inals and the effect of the prison capacity on it have never been studied before in a mathematical
framework. The behavior of the model is investigated through stability analysis, bifurcation analy-
sis, and numerical simulations. By analyzing the corresponding system of equations, we demonstrate
how the crime-related parameters such as the arrest rate, the rehabilitation rate and the capacity
of the prison affect the criminal distribution at equilibrium. The results also suggests an optimal
allocation of the police resources to minimize occurrence of serious crimes. This may be used to
assist policy-makers in the development of effective crime control strategies.
2 Model
Basic assumptions
We first formulate our proposal as a compartmental model, with the population T > 0 being
divided into five disjoint groups N,M,F, PM and PF . The group N represents non-criminals who
have never involved any criminals or have finished serving their prison sentence. M and F denote
individuals who have committed misdemeanor and felony respectively, but have not get arrested
yet. Once they are arrested and are sentenced to be imprisoned, they become inmates, PM and PF ,
respectively. They may return to normal civilian N after serving their sentence in prison. However,
part of them commit a crime again, reverting back to M or F . Figure 1 shows the structure of
transitions occurring between groups in the basic model.
In the absence of good evidence to the contrary, we follow the common rules in population
dynamics: 1) the transfer out of any particular group is proportional to its size. 2) if the transfer is
caused by contact between two group members, it is proportional to the size of both groups. Based
on the rule 1, we set c ≥ 0 and d ≥ 0 to express the transition rates from N to M , and from M to
F , respectively.
N
c−→M and M d−→ F (1)
We assume the direct transition from N to F is negligible compared to that from M to F . The
sequential transition from N through M to F is justified from the report that most of those people
who commit major crime have committed minor crimes before [21].
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Figure 1: Transition diagram for the basis model. The direct transition from N to F is considered
negligible and is not implemented in the model.
The second rule(transition by contact) is based on the assumption that the population is homo-
geneously mixed, and should be dealt in our model with care. While the models for organized gang
crimes [7, 32] treat the transition between gang members as contagion by frequent contact, such
analogy with epidemic process may be not adequate for daily contacts occurring in a general society.
Considering the nature of criminals that hide their true intension from others, we can presume that
assimilation with criminals occurring by random contact is rare and negligible compared to other
factors that we will consider in the following sections.
Once criminals are caught and convicted, they are imprisoned to serve their sentence. If the
parameters aM ≥ 0 and aF ≥ 0 are respectively the arrest-and-conviction rates for misdemeanor
and felony, the corresponding transitions are
M
aM−−→ PM and F aF−→ PF (2)
Let iM > 0 and iF > 0 be the period of imprisonment for minor and major criminals, respectively.
In addition, let 0 ≤ rM ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ rF ≤ 1 denote the rehabilitation rates for minor and major
criminals, respectively, which determines the proportion of prisoners moving back to after release.
Then we have the transitions
PM
rM/iM−−−−−→ N and PF rF /iF−−−−→ N (3)
This implies that the other portions, 1− rM and 1− rF , of inmates commit a crime again, as
PM
(1−rM )/iM−−−−−−−−→M and PF (1−rF )/iF−−−−−−−→ F (4)
Broken windows effect out of prisons
Although the above transitions describe the basic structure of dynamics between criminals and
non-criminals, it does not properly reflect important interactions between them. We extend the
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basic model to incorporate the broken windows theory. The theory states that seemingly petty
signals of mischief, if not adequately controlled, elicit more serious crime. In order to describe the
atmospheric pressure that accelerates transition from minor criminals to major criminals, we add
to (1) the quadratic size effect as
M
bM−−→ F (5)
where b ≥ 0 is the coefficient that represents the broken-windows effect.
Crime-school effect in prisons
We further extend the model to investigate how interactions in prison influence post-release behavior
of criminals. The beneficial deterrent effect of prison may be weakened by the negative side-effects
of incarceration: Through routine contacts in a limited facility area, criminals get to learn from
each other, build new networks and find new opportunities for crime [13].
We assume that, in prison, criminal motivations and skills are spread between inmates and the
“contagion” occurs by frequent contacts between them. To describe such in-prison transition from
the minor criminals to the major criminals, we define P ′M as those who used to be minor criminals
and turn to be major criminals by assimilation with them. They emerged from the transitions as
PM + PF
β−→ P ′M + PF and PM + P ′M β−→ P ′M + P ′M (6)
where β ≥ 0 is the transmission contact rate of prisoners. It is desirable to maintain the total
number of the prisoners under the capacity of the prison facilities. Overcrowding in prison increases
intensity of interactions between prisoners and raises risk of recidivism [19]. The existence of P ′M is
problematic, as they are virtually major criminals, while they are treated as minor ones: they are
“disguised major criminals” and are released after short detention with a low rehabilitation rate.
P ′M
rF /iM−−−−→ N and P ′M
(1−rF )/iM−−−−−−−→ F. (7)
Now, based on the transitions (1) to (7), we derive the corresponding model as
dN
dt
= −cN + rM
iM
PM +
rF
iF
PF +
rF
iM
P ′M
dM
dt
= cN − (aM + d)M − bM2 + 1− rM
iM
PM
dF
dt
= dM + bM2 − aFF + 1− rF
iF
PF +
1− rF
iM
P ′M
dPM
dt
= aMM − 1
iM
PM − βPM (PF + P ′M )
dPF
dt
= aFF − 1
iF
PF
dP ′M
dt
= − 1
iM
P ′M + βPM (PF + P
′
M )
(8)
where N (0) ≥ 0,M (0) ≥ 0, F (0) ≥ 0, PM (0) ≥ 0, PF (0) ≥ 0 and P ′M (0) ≥ 0. In our work, we
assume that the transitions between the compartments of the model converge to equilibrium in short
time scales and the society maintains with a fixed total population T = N+M+F +PM +PF +P ′M
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in the meantime. The model does not consider birth and death of population: including these
factors requires nontrivial extension of work, since there are substantial difference in the death rate
between criminals and non-criminals. It has been reported that incarceration seriously reduces life
expectancy [35]. Some study has shown that five years behind bars increased the chance of death
by 78% and shortened the expected life span at age 30 by 10 years [25]. To involve these factors
in the model, one needs to find a possible mechanism that induces such difference in demographic
data. We leave this as a plausible extension of the current model for the future study.
3 Analysis of Model
The model (8) is a 6-dimensional nonlinear systems and is hard to analytically study as is. In the
following, we investigate the asymptotic behaviours of the model for the four extreme cases; i) no
crime-school effect, ii) no broken-windows effect, iii) low arrest rate and strong punishment, and
iv) strong precaution and low rehabilitation.
Theorem 1 (No crime-school effect). Suppose all the parameters in the system (8) are positive
except β = 0. There is a unique equilibrium (N?,M?, F ?, P ?M , P
?
F , P
′?
M ) of the system (8) such that
M? =
−p+√w
2q
,
F ? =
cT − sMM?
sF
P ?M = iMaMM
?,
P ?F = iFaFF
?,
P ′?M = 0,
N? = T −M? − F ? − P ?M − P ?F ,
where
p = cd+ cdaF iF + caF rF + daF rF + caMaF iMrF + aMaF rMrF ,
q = bc+ bcaF iF + baF rF ,
w = p2 + 4caF rF qT,
sM = c+ aM iM + aMrM ,
sF = c+ aF iF + aF rF .
The equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable either for sufficiently small values of aM and aF ,
or for sufficiently large values of iM and iF .
Without the crime-school effect, no minor criminals in the prison degenerates to potential
felonies, that is, P ′?M = 0. The population of minor and major criminals in and out of the prison
are directly proportional with the arrest rate and the imprisonment period. One can estimate the
population of the uncaught criminals from the number of inmates as
M? =
1
iMaM
P ?M and F
? =
1
iFaF
P ?F . (9)
The next theorem shows that the distribution of criminals become more complex if minor criminals
in prison can turn into potential felonies.
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Theorem 2 (No broken-windows effect). Let b = 0. There is a unique equilibrium (N?,M?, F ?, P ?M , P
?
F , P
′?
M )
of the system of (8)
M? =
1
uiM
(caF iMrFT − P ?MsF )
F ? =
1
uiM
((d+ aM (1− rF )) ciMT + P ?M (drF − drM − sM ))
P ?M =
−p+√w
2q
P ?F = aF iFF
?
P ′?M = −P ?M + aM iMM?
where
p = cd+ cdaF iF + cdβaF iM iFT + cβaMaF iM iFT + caF rF + daF rF + caMaF + daF rF
+ caMaF iMrF + cβaMaF i
2
MrFT + aMaF rMrF − cβaMaF iM iF rFT
q = −cdβiM − cβaF iF − cdβaF iM iF − cβaMaF iM iF − dβaF iF rM
− βaMaF iF rM − cβaF iMrF − dβaF iMrF − cβaMaF i2MrF + cβaF iF rF + dβaF iF rF
+ cβaMaF iM iF rF − βaMaF iMrMrF + βaMaF iF rMrF
w = p2 + 4caMaF iMrF qT
u = cd+ caM + cdaF iF + caMaF iF − caMrF + caF rF + daF rF
+ aMaF rF + caMaF iMrF − caMaF iF rF
sM = c− crF + caM iM + aMrM − caM iMrF − aMrMrF
sF = c− crF + caF iF + aF rF − caF iF rF − aF rMrF
The equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable for sufficiently small aM and aF .
One can confirm that P ′?M > 0 at equilibrium if b = 0. Since the potential felonies P
′
M are
formally counted as minor criminals, estimate of the criminal population based on the number
minor and major criminals as in (9) results in an undershoot of minor criminals in society.
In the next two theorems we describe asymptotic behaviour of the model (8) with small param-
eters, based on the geometric perturbation theory [33]. Theorem 3 deals with the case of the low
arrest rate and the long imprisonment for major criminals. This corresponds to the situation that
the police fail to track down criminals properly due to limited budget or lack of effective measures,
while they make an example of few arrested criminals by punishing them severely.
Theorem 3 (Low arrest rate and strong punishment). Suppose aF = k1 and 1iF = k2 where
0 <   1 and k1, k2 > 0. Then, the corresponding degenerate system has a solution Γ0 =(
N0,M0, F 0, P 0M , P
0
F , P
′0
M
)
where
N0 (t) = M0 (t) = P 0M (t) = P
′0
M (t) = 0,
P 0F =
k1
k1 + k2
T + C exp (− (k1 + k2)Tt) , and F 0 (t) = T − P 0F (t)
for some C ∈ R. here exists a locally unique attracting solution Γ of the system (8) for  sufficiently
small, which tends to Γ0 for → 0.
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Theorem 3 shows that if the arrest rate for major crimes is extremely low, no matter how strong
the punishment is, most population turns into major criminals, either in or out of the prison. The
next case is for the low transition rate c and the low rehabilitation rates rM and rF . One of
the possible scenario for this is stigmatizing persons who have ever committed crimes and hardly
accepting them as a part of society. This also gives a signal of strong precaution to people that
they can be expelled from the society even with one minor criminal activity, leading to the low
transition rate c.
Theorem 4 (Strong precaution and low rehabilitation). Suppose rM = k1, rF = k2 and c = k3
where 0 <   1 and k1, k2, k3 > 0. Then, the corresponding degenerate system has a solution
Γ0 =
(
N0,M0, F 0, P 0M , P
0
F , P
′0
M
)
where
M0 (t) = P 0M (t) = P
′0
M (t) = 0,
N0 (t) =
k2aF
k2aF + k3 (1 + aF iF )
T + C exp
(
−
(
aF
1 + aF iF
k2 + k3
)
t
)
,
F 0 (t) =
1
1 + aF iF
(
T −N0 (t)) , and P 0F (t) = aF iF1 + aF iF (T −N0 (t))
for some C ∈ R. here exists a locally unique attracting solution Γ of the system (8) for  sufficiently
small, which tends to Γ0 for → 0.
Making criminals’ rehabilitation hard with strict separation eventually divides the population
into non-criminals and felonies. To have a larger potion of non-criminals, however, we need to hold
relatively higher level of the rehabilitation rate than the transition rate, that is, k2 > k3.
4 Bifurcation Analysis
In this section, we perform the bifurcation analysis of the proposed model (8). For a typical
simulation, we set the parameters as
b = 0.00001, c = 0.00012, d = 0.0004
aM = 0.1, aF = 0.1, rM = 0.4, rF = 0.2
β = 0.001, iM = 0.5, iF = 5.
(10)
These parameters are calibrated such that the distribution of major/minor criminals and their arrest
rates largely agree with crime statistics in several countries [8, 15]. We set the total population
T = 1, 000, 000 through out the analysis. In Figure 2, the bifurcation diagram for the broken-
windows effect b is illustrated. The minor crime tends to decrease and the major crime increases
as b grows. This implies that elimination of environmental factors that reveal misdemeanors is
important to prevent occurrence of more serious crimes. Note that keeping b near zero cuts down
major criminals to a negligible level. This implies that the broken widows effect becomes even more
important in a safe society where the ratio of major criminals is relatively low.
While suppressing b promotes the preventive effect on serious crimes out of prison, controls
inside prison can work as a more practical measure against crimes. The bifurcation diagram in
Figure 3 shows how the distribution of criminals changes with the contact rate β in prison. The
rise of β increases the number of major criminals in society.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium distribution according to the broken-windows effect b
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Figure 3: Equilibrium distribution according to the in-prison contact rate β
Another in-prison measure to control crimes is the period of imprisonment for criminals. There
are mixed evidence regarding the question of whether spending more time in prison increases the
rehabilitation rate [14, 16]. However, here we assume that the period of imprisonment and the
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rehabilitation rate are weakly positively correlated, as long as criminals are held in custody in a
effectively managed facility. Let us denote w ≥ 1 as a general weight of offense and set the period
of imprisonment as
iM = w i
min
M and iF = w i
min
F (11)
where iminM = 0.5(year) and i
min
F = 5(year) are the minimum period for minor and major criminals,
respectively. The weight of offense is also related with the rehabilitation rate. We set as
rM = 0.06w + 0.34 and rF = 0.03w + 0.17 (12)
so that rM and rF slightly increases with w. Note that this agrees with (9) when w = 1.
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
weight of offense  w
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Minor Criminal
Felony
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Imprisoned Felony
(a) β = 0.0002
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Imprisoned Felony
(b) β = 0.001
Figure 4: Equilibrium distribution according to the weight of offense w (a) at β = 0.0002 and (b)
at β = 0.001.
Figure 4 shows how the weight of offense contributes to the criminal distribution in two cases:
(a) with β = 0.0002 and (b) β = 0.001. It is no surprising that the number of inmates increases
with w in both cases, since a higher weight of offense means a longer detention. More noteworthy
differentiation between (a) and (b) is the change in F , the number of major criminals in society,
according to w. When the transmission contact rate is as low as β = 0.0002, a higher weight of
offense reduces the number of criminals. On the contrary, when β = 0.001, assigning more weight of
offense leads to increase of major crimes in society. Hence a higher weight of offense has a positive
reform effect only when the frequent contact between prisoners is effectively prohibited.
Changes in the security measures are likely to have a greater impact on crime [17]. Let us
investigate how the allocation of the police resource to control activity of major/minor crime affects
the distribution of criminals. Let cT be the total budget for security. Also let cM and cF be the
budget for control of minor crime and major crime, respectively. Note cT = cM + cF . We assume
that the arrest rate is proportional to the budget used to control the crime. Then we can set
aM = eMcM and aF = eF cF where eM and eF are the police efficiency for minor and major
crime, respectively. In the example, eM = 0.2 and eF = 0.04 are used. Figure 5 shows how the
budget ratio cF /cT affects the number of major criminals. The minimum of F is achieved at around
cF /cT ≈ 0.4. Spending more portion of the budget for the major crime control brings negligence
on minor crimes, which eventually leads to excessive occurrence of major crimes due to the broken
windows effect and the crime school effect.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium distribution according to the allocation of police resource. eM = 0.2, eF =
0.04
5 Discussion
We here present the mathematical models for crime dynamics that mainly focus on transition from
minor to major criminals occurring in and out of prisons. It is confirmed that both the broken
windows effect and the crime-school effect greatly change the criminal distribution. While utilizing
the broken windows effect is a preventive measure, improving conditions in correctional facilities
can provide a more direct and efficient measure against crimes. The presented work showed that
suppressing interactions between overcrowded inmates in prisons is crucial in controlling crimes
in society. If not keeping the in-prison contact rate at a low level, extension of the period of
imprisonment only results in rapid increase in major crimes.
The model also shows the importance of an balanced resource allocation between control activity
devoted to serious crimes and that devoted to minor crimes. The analysis confirms that, due to
the broken windows effect and the crime-school effect, targeting only major crimes can be very
inefficient and even bring an opposite result that increases major criminals. While the results in
this work are not predictions, we hope that they can provide useful insights into crime dynamics
and possibly suggest effective policies towards crime abatement.
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